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I. INTRODUCTION
If the government or another entity with the power of eminent
domain, such as a utility company or a railroad, takes possession of land
before acquiring title to it, what are the owner’s rights? The owner has a
*
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constitutional right to sue for the land’s value in an inverse condemnation
action. 1 But does the owner also have an action for trespass? The answer
to this question varies widely among the states because it involves two
fundamental and potentially conflicting legal principles—government
sovereignty over land and the protection of private property rights,
particularly against abusive government conduct.
The absence of trespass liability in some jurisdictions is in marked
contrast to the usual rules. Since common law’s earliest age, liability for
trespass has been strict. Under the principles of the common law, a
trespasser is liable even if its entry onto another’s land was unintentional
and even if the entry caused no damage. 2 Moreover, entities with the
eminent domain power are liable for trespass in every other context unless
sovereign immunity bars the action. Why is precondemnation entry
different?
This question has substantial practical, as well as theoretical,
importance. For example, in an inverse condemnation action an owner
normally cannot recover consequential damages, but they are recoverable
in a trespass action. 3 Similarly, punitive damages, 4 statutory damage
1.
In Ohio, the landowner has a mandamus action to compel the institution
of condemnation proceedings, rather than an inverse condemnation action. Trafalgar
Corp. v. Miami County Bd. of County Comm’rs, No. 2002-CA-20, 2004 WL 68014, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2004); Hardale Inv. Co. v. State, No. 98-BA-40, 2000 WL
459704, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2000); Consol. Rail Corp. v. City of Gahanna,
No. 95APE12-1578, 1996 WL 257457, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 16, 1996). For ease of
reference, this Article will include the mandamus action in the term “inverse
condemnation.”
2.
6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.1 (1954); 9 RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 64A.01[3] (2000).
3.
Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738, 741 (Colo.
1974); Cohen v. Mayor of Wilmington, 99 A.2d 393, 395 (Del. Ch. 1953); Grainland
Farms, Inc. v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 722 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); Balt. & O.R.
Co. v. Boyd, 10 A. 315, 317–18 (Md. 1887); Huber v. Portland Gas & Coke Co., 274 P.
509, 511 (Or. 1929).
4.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.170 (2007);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (Supp. 2007); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon Supp. 2007); WIS. STAT. § 895.043
(2006); Bowman v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., No. 87-3166, 1988 WL 68890, at
*2 (6th Cir. July 6, 1988); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Natural
Gas Storage Easement, 747 F. Supp. 401, 403 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Regan v. Cherry
Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 153 (D.R.I. 1989); Alaska v. 13.90 Acres of Land, 625 F. Supp.
1315, 1322 (D. Alaska 1985); Hogan v. Ala. Power Co., 351 So. 2d 1378, 1382 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1977); Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth., 375 P.2d 696, 702 (Alaska 1962); Gila
Water Co. v. Gila Land & Cattle Co., 249 P. 751, 753–54 (Ariz. 1926); Sw. Gas & Elec.
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multipliers, 5 and criminal liability 6 may be available for trespass, though
Co. v. Patterson Orchard Co., 20 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Ark. 1929); Roaring Fork Club, L.P.
v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1234 (Colo. 2001); Otley v. McCarthy, No.
CV020816358S, 2003 WL 23112729, at *13–14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2003); Keller
v. Del-Homes, Inc., No. C.A. 97C-02-040, 2000 WL 973080, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar.
31, 2000); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Walker, 440 So. 2d 659, 660–61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Sheriff, 436 S.E.2d 14, 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Chin
Kee v. Kaeleku Sugar Co., 29 Haw. 524, 532 (1926); Cox v. Stolworthy, 496 P.2d 682,
684 (Idaho 1972); Roark v. Musgrave, 355 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976);
Anderson, Etc., R.R. Co. v. Kernodle, 54 Ind. 314, 319 (1876); Sigsbee v. Swathwood,
419 N.E.2d 789, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Stevenson, 363
N.E.2d 1254, 1262–63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Nemecek v. Santee, No. 05-518, 2006 WL
334298, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2006); Ultimate Chem. Co. v. Surface Transp.
Int’l, Inc., 658 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Kan. 1983); Grainland Farms, Inc. v. Ark. La. Gas Co.,
722 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); Roberie v. VonBokern, No. 2004-SC-000250DG, 2006 WL 2454647, at *6–7 (Ky. Aug. 24, 2006); Zimmerman v. Helser, 32 Md. 274,
277–78 (1870); Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 571–72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979);
Brantner Farms, Inc. v. Garner, No. C6-01-1572, 2002 WL 1163559, at *5 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 4, 2002); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Hoskins, 32 So. 150, 151 (Miss. 1902); Hayden
v. Grand River Mut. Tel. Corp., 440 S.W.2d 161, 166–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969);
Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 67–68 (N.H. 1972) (although New
Hampshire does not allow punitive damages, the compensatory damage award can be
increased if the defendant’s conduct was “wanton, malicious, or oppressive”); La
Bruno v. Lawrence, 166 A.2d 822, 824–25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960); Kupersmidt
v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 282 N.Y.S.2d 605, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Allen v. Transok Pipe Line Co.,
552 P.2d 375, 382 (Okla. 1976); Huber v. Portland Gas & Coke Co., 274 P. 509, 511 (Or.
1929); Katlin v. Tremoglie, 43 Pa. D. & C.4th 373, 398–99 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1999); Erlanger
v. Gobern, No. WC 85-348, 1990 WL 10000164, at *8–9 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 5, 1990);
Hinson v. A.T. Sistare Constr. Co., 113 S.E.2d 341, 344 (S.C. 1960); Till v. Bennett, 281
N.W.2d 276, 278–79 (S.D. 1979); Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d
632, 641 (Tenn. 1996); Powers v. Taylor, 379 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah 1963); Moore v.
Duke, 80 A. 194, 197 (Vt. 1911); Hamilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 445
S.E.2d 140, 143 (Va. 1994); Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 237 P. 255, 271, 275 (Wyo. 1925).
5.
ALA. CODE § 9-13-62 (LexisNexis 2001); ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.730; ARK.
CODE ANN. § 15-32-301 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3346 (West 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-560 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 1401(b)
(1989); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-202 (2004); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/2 (West
2002); IOWA CODE § 658.4 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 364.130(1) (LexisNexis
2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4278.1(B) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
7552(4) (2003); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 5-409 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 242, § 7 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2919(1) (West 2004); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 548.05 (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-5-10(1) (West 2007); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 40.160 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 539:4 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M.
STAT. § 30-14-1.1 (2004); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 861(2) (McKinney 1979 &
Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.1 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-30 (1996);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 901.51 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 72
(West 1987 & Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.810, 105.815 (West 2003); 42
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they are unavailable for inverse condemnation. In some jurisdictions,
trespass has a longer statute of limitations than inverse condemnation; 7 in
others, the right to a jury trial exists for one action but not for the other. 8
Courts in some jurisdictions include the value of improvements made by a
trespassing condemnor in the just compensation award, 9 though the result
is the opposite if the condemnor is not characterized as a trespasser. 10 An
issue of greater importance to many landowners than the amount of
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8311 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-20-1 (1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-10 (2004 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-28-312 (2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-3 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3606 (1998); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-333 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.12.030 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-3-48a (LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.09(3), 182.017(5) (West
2004 & Supp. 2007).
6.
ALA. CODE § 13A-7-4 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.330
(2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-203 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 602 (West 1999);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 821 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.09 (West 2007); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-7-21 (West 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-814 (1993 & Supp. 2006);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-432-2(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2004); IOWA CODE § 716.8; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3721 (1995);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.080; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:63; ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17A, §§ 402, 404 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-402 (LexisNexis 2002);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.552 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.605 (West 2003 & Supp.
2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-87 (1999 & Supp. 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.140
(West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-520, 28-521 (LexisNexis 2003); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 227-J:8, 539:9, 635:2 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-3 (West 2005);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.05 (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-159.12; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-22-03 (1997 & Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.21 (LexisNexis
2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1835 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.245;
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-26 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-35-6 (2006); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-14-405 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (2003 & Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3705
(1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-119 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.080 (West
2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3B-3 (LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.13
(West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-303 (2007).
7.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-542(3), 12-821 (2003) (two years for
trespass; one year for inverse condemnation); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-52(3), 40A-51
(2005) (three years for trespass; two years for inverse condemnation); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8.01-243(B), 8.01-246(4) (2007) (five years for trespass; three years for inverse
condemnation);
8.
E.g., Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738, 742 (Colo.
1974); State ex rel. Smith v. 0.24148 Acres of Land, 171 A.2d 228, 231 (Del. 1961);
Childs v. Vill. of Newport, 39 A. 627, 628 (Vt. 1898).
9.
E.g., Salesian Soc’y, Inc. v. Vill. of Ellenville, 505 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App.
Div. 1986); Chase v. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 30 P. 757, 757 (Utah 1892). Contra Jones v. New
Orleans & Selma R.R. Co. & Immigration Ass’n, 70 Ala. 227, 234 (Dec. 1881).
10.
E.g., Kelly v. City of Waterbury, 73 A. 136, 137 (Conn. 1909).
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damages they can recover is whether they can reclaim their land by ejecting
the trespasser and the structures it built, such as utility poles and railroad
lines. Ejectment and injunctive relief are unavailable in an inverse
condemnation action, though they often are available in a trespass action. 11
The importance of a condemnor’s trespass liability for
precondemnation entry also is demonstrated by the hundreds of published
decisions concerning this issue. This Article will first analyze this body of
case law and the different analytic approaches that the courts have
adopted. This Article will then examine the practical implications of the
differences among the jurisdictions. Finally, this Article will recommend
that trespass liability always exist for a wrongful precondemnation entry.
II. CASE LAW
Cases concerning wrongful precondemnation entries arise in a variety
of factual circumstances. In some cases, the condemnor entered the land
with the good faith belief that it had the right to do so. For example, it may
have entered based on condemnation proceedings that a court
subsequently invalidated. 12 Similarly, the condemnor may have acquired a
deed or easement from someone it incorrectly believed to be the owner 13
or mistakenly may have deviated from the bounds of the land that it did
acquire. 14
11.
E.g., Jones, 70 Ala. at 230; Chicago, St. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Gates, 11 N.E.
527, 528 (Ill. 1887); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Hoskins, 32 So. 150, 151 (Miss. 1902); Perley v.
Town of Effingham, 48 A.2d 484, 486 (N.H. 1946); Menge v. Morris & E. R.R. Co., 67
A. 1028, 1029 (N.J. Ch. 1907); Callen v. Columbus Edison Elec. Light Co., 64 N.E. 141,
145 (Ohio 1902); JENELLE MIMS MARSH & CHARLES W. GAMBLE, ALABAMA LAW OF
DAMAGES § 16:59 (5th ed. 2004).
12.
E.g., Sw. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Patterson Orchard Co., 20 S.W.2d 636, 637
(Ark. 1929); Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 10 So. 465, 467, 472 (Fla.
1891); Pettit v. Comm’rs of Wicomico County, 90 A. 993, 996–97 (Md. 1914); Balt. &
Ohio R.R. Co. v. Boyd, 63 Md. 325, 331 (1885); Radway v. Selectmen of Dennis, 165
N.E. 410, 412 (Mass. 1929); Lewis v. City of Jeffersonville, No. 4:02-CV-00221-DFHWG, 2004 WL 1629741, at *6–9 (S.D. Ind. July 6, 2004); Matador Pipelines, Inc. v.
Watson, 626 S.W.2d 139, 140–41 (Tex. App. 1981); Wheeler v. Town of St. Johnsbury,
87 A. 349, 352 (Vt. 1913).
13.
E.g., Doelle v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 872 F.2d 942, 943 (10th Cir.
1989); Mo. & N.A.R. Co. v. Chapman, 234 S.W. 171, 172 (Ark. 1921); Buholtz v.
Rochester Tel. Corp., 339 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776–77 (App. Div. 1973); Enon Valley Tel. Co.
v. Market, 493 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); White v. State Highway Comm’r
of Va., 114 S.E.2d 614, 615 (Va. 1960).
14.
Wickwire v. City of Juneau, 557 P.2d 783, 783–84 (Alaska 1976);
Grainland Farms, Inc. v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 722 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986);
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However, in many other cases the trespass was deliberate, 15 and
often so egregious that the landowner recovered punitive damages. 16 For
example, in Williams v. City of Baton Rouge, the city and parish excavated
three wide canals across the plaintiffs’ land over their strenuous
objections. 17 The work proceeded even though a judge denied permission
for the excavations and though the police department’s attorney and the
assistant parish attorney told the defendants that they did not have
Ladue Group, L.C. v. Level 3 Commc’ns, L.L.C., 111 S.W.3d 492, 493 (Mo. Ct. App.
2003); Salesian Soc’y, Inc., 505 N.Y.S.2d at 198; Rawlings v. Bucks County Water &
Sewer Auth., 702 A.2d 583, 584 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); Deets v. Mountaintop Area
Joint Sanitary Auth., 479 A.2d 49, 50–51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); Lovett v. W. Va.
Cent. Gas Co., 65 S.E. 196, 197 (W. Va. 1909).
15.
E.g., Bowman v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 1988 WL 68890, at *1
(6th Cir. July 6, 1988) (defendant gas company stored gas under owners’ land knowing
that it did not have the right to do so); Hayden v. Grand River Mut. Tel. Corp., 440
S.W.2d 161, 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (defendant telephone company knowingly
entered without right); Broome v. N.Y. & N.J. Tel. Co., 7 A. 851, 851 (N.J. Ch. 1887)
(defendant telephone company erected poles on plaintiff’s land before condemnation
over owner’s “protest and remonstrance, and in disregard of his warning and express
prohibition”); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Deyle, 223 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (Sup. Ct.
1961) (defendant wrongfully cut trees and laid power line despite owner’s objections);
Blodgett v. Utica & Black River R.R. Co., 64 Barb. 580, 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873)
(defendant wrongfully cut timber and laid railroad line one year before beginning
condemnation proceedings); Allen v. Transok Pipe Line Co., 552 P.2d 375, 377 (Okla.
1976) (defendant knowingly built pipeline without condemnation, compensation, or
consent); Hinson v. A. T. Sistare Constr. Co., 113 S.E.2d 341, 343 (S.C. 1960)
(defendant knowingly entered without right); Russell v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 435
P.2d 294, 295 (Utah 1967) (defendant ordered its contractor to enter plaintiff’s land
and the contractor entered “[o]ver the objection of the [owners,] accompanied by
opprobrious epithets and a little unflattering use of the king’s English, [and] bulldozed,
not only the ire of [the owners], but the ditch and easement themselves”); Kendall v.
Missisquoi & Clyde River R.R. Co., 55 Vt. 438, 441–42 (1882) (railroad company built
knowing that it did not have the right to do so); City of Seattle v. Loutsis Inv. Co., 554
P.2d 379, 387 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (before condemnation, city employee copied
landowner’s key without permission and illegally entered property); W. Va. Dep’t. of
Highways v. Roda, 352 S.E.2d 134, 136 (W. Va. 1986) (defendant highway department
began constructing highway on plaintiff’s land and allowed its contractor to take and
sell coal from the land knowing it did not have the right to do so); Brown v. Wis.-Minn.
Light & Power Co., 174 N.W. 903, 904 (Wis. 1919) (defendant cut down trees on a right
of way it purchased from plaintiff knowing it did not have the right to do so).
16.
E.g., O’Neil Corp. v. Perry Gas Transmission, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 335, 339–
40, 344 (Tex. App. 1983) (jury awarded punitive damages for willful and malicious
precondemnation trespass); Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Watson, 626 S.W.2d 139, 140–41
(Tex. App. 1981) (jury awarded punitive damages for willful and malicious
precondemnation construction of pipe line on plaintiff’s land).
17.
Williams v. City of Baton Rouge, 731 So. 2d 240, 243–45 (La. 1999).
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authority. 18 Armed guards were posted at the site twenty-four hours a day
for approximately two months while the work was in progress. 19 In other
cases involving wrongful entry over the owner’s objections, the condemnor
left the property when the owner objected, promising not to return, and
then re-entered when the owner left the area. 20
In many cases, the condemnor frankly admitted that convenience and
cost savings motivated its wrongful actions. 21 For example, in Oglethorpe
Power Corp. v. Sheriff, a utility company intentionally cut trees outside its
right of way for the stated purpose of deferring maintenance of the right of
way “for a long time.” 22 Perhaps surprisingly in light of these often selfserving motives, bad faith has been irrelevant to the courts’ determinations
concerning the availability of a trespass action in all but one jurisdiction.
Bad faith has been relevant only in determining the appropriate remedies,
such as punitive or multiple damages. Instead, courts are often guided by
their views concerning the relative importance of government sovereignty
and of private property rights.
Despite variations in theory, almost every state can be included in
one of the following categories: (1) a trespass action is always available for
precondemnation entry; (2) a trespass action is never available; (3) a
trespass action is unavailable against a government entity but is available
against a private entity; (4) trespass and inverse condemnation are
alternative forms of action; and (5) a trespass action is available only in
limited circumstances. This Article will examine each of these categories.
It will not discuss cases in which an unlawful entry does not constitute a
taking because they do not involve conduct that potentially creates liability
for both trespass and inverse condemnation. 23 It also will not examine the
18.
Id. at 244.
19.
Id. at 245.
20.
E.g., Cohen v. Mayor of Wilmington, 99 A.2d 393, 394 (Del. Ch. 1953)
(state highway department assured plaintiff that none of his land would be taken to
widen a road in front of his property; without notice to plaintiff and while he was out of
town, highway department ripped up his yard, walk, and front steps); Moore v. N. &
S.C. Ry. Co., 77 S.E. 926, 927 (S.C. 1913) (when railroad construction crew came to
plaintiff’s land, he “forbade their entry; . . . they promised him they would not enter,
but left and went to work elsewhere; . . . they returned, when he was at dinner, and,
taking advantage of his absence, built the railroad across his land”).
21.
E.g., Williams v. Goose Lake Valley Irrigation Co., 163 P. 81, 83 (Or.
1917) (defendant trespassed “to finish [a] ditch so as to be able to use it the next year”).
22.
Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Sheriff, 436 S.E.2d 14, 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
23.
The clearest example is an entry when the right to take by eminent
domain did not exist. See, e.g., Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1114–15 (Ariz.
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cases in the few states in which the authority is so conflicting—in
sometimes very striking terms—that accurate categorization is impossible.
These states include California, 24 Connecticut, 25 Kentucky, 26 Montana, 27
Ct. App. 1992) (no public purpose); Kennedy v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 681 P.2d 53,
56–57 (N.M. 1984) (no public purpose); Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima
Interurban Lines Ass’n, 126 P.3d 16, 28–29 (Wash. 2006) (condemnor exceeded
statutory authority). An inverse condemnation action is also unavailable if the entry
did not interfere so substantially with the owner’s rights that it constituted a taking.
E.g., Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357, 373–74 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
Alfieri v. Delaware, No. CA 841, 1984 WL 478437, *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1984); Poole v.
Township of Dist., 843 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
24.
Compare Garden Water Corp. v. Fambrough, 53 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) (“[A]cts constituting inverse condemnation amount to more than those
of simple trespass.” (quoting Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357, 375 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963)), and Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (“The . . . action based on [the California Constitution’s taking clause] is
sometimes designated a proceeding in inverse condemnation . . . and, as such, includes
within its purview . . . actions for . . . trespass.” (citations omitted)), with L.A. Brick &
Clay Prods. Co. v. City of L.A., 141 P.2d 46, 50–51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943) (city’s
wrongful entry constitutes trespass though it was within city’s eminent domain power).
25.
Compare Vincent Bros. v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 59 A. 491, 493
(Conn. 1904) (precondemnation entry by railroad was not a trespass because a real
trespasser could not obtain a legal right to be in possession by paying compensation;
court states that, if the railroad was characterized as a trespasser, it would have been
liable for damages in excess of compensation for the taking), with City of Bristol v.
Tilcon Minerals, Inc., No. CV970572219, 2004 WL 1462628, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct.
June 9, 2004) (precondemnation taking by a landfill was a trespass because “any
intrusion under or over another’s land constitutes a trespass”), and Pinney v. Town of
Winchester, 76 A. 994, 994 (Conn. 1910) (referring to a precompensatory taking as a
“trespass”).
26.
Compare Clemmer v. Rowan Water, Inc., No. 0:04 CV 165 HRW, 2006
WL 449266, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2006) (trespass action unavailable), and Witbeck
v. Big Rivers Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 412 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Ky. 1967) (same), with
Bushart v. Fulton County, 209 S.W. 499, 503 (Ky. 1919) (trespass action available), and
Waller v. Martin, 56 Ky. 181, 17 T.B. Mon. 144, 153 (1856) (trespass unavailable against
a railroad corporation for precondemnation entry but available against railroad’s
president and directors as agents of the corporation).
27.
Compare Riddock v. City of Helena, 687 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Mont. 1984)
(“The landowner’s only remedy for the City’s construction of a pipeline on his land
without obtaining an easement is an inverse condemnation action for just
compensation for the value of the easement on the date of taking . . . . This rule allows
the public entity to compensate the damaged landowner and keep the property interest
taken.”), with City of Three Forks v. State Highway Comm’n, 480 P.2d 826, 830 (Mont.
1971) (“[A] state agency which takes property in violation of the constitution, without
prior judicial authority for the taking, should pay trespass damages in a suit by a
landowner to recover for this illegal taking. If in such instance the landowner should
receive only the value of the land taken . . . the State is thus liable only for the same
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Nevada, 28 and Rhode Island. 29
A. Trespass Action Always Available
Courts that impose trespass liability for a precondemnation entry do
so based on the fundamental principle that law limits the eminent domain
power. 30 These courts permit the taking of private property rights only in
amount as if it had brought a condemnation proceeding in accordance with the law. If
that should be the holding, judicial condemnation proceedings required by the
Constitution are a useless formality, and at the same time the landowner is deprived of
the additional compensation to which he is entitled for the violation of his
constitutional property right to be free from unlawful trespasses and takings of his
land, whether by the State or by private persons.”).
28.
Compare County of Clark v. Bonanza No. 1, 615 P.2d 939, 945 (Nev. 1980)
(county liable for just compensation but not trespass damages for precondemnation
entry), with County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072, 1074–75, 1077 (Nev. 1980)
(affirming district court’s holding that county is liable for trespass damages and for just
compensation for precondemnation entry).
29.
Compare Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 327 (R.I. 1995) (“The
inverse-condemnation cause of action provides landowners with a means of seeking
redress for governmental intrusions that, if performed by private citizens, would
warrant analysis under the law of trespass.”), with Lonsdale Co. v. City of Woonsocket,
56 A. 448, 452 (R.I. 1903) (“A taking without compensation is a trespass . . . .”).
30.
E.g., Gully v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 774 F.2d 1287, 1293 (5th Cir. 1985);
Snowden v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 238 F. 495, 500 (8th Cir. 1916); Justus v. Kellogg
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611 (W.D. Va. 2005); Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, 747 F. Supp. 401,
404–05 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Ala. Power Co. v. Thompson, 32 So. 2d 795, 801–02 (Ala.
1947); Jefferson County v. Flanagan, 722 So. 2d 763, 765 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); City of
Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 184 n.20 (Colo. 1993); Alfieri v. State, No. CA
841, 1984 WL 478437, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1984); Wehrum v. Vill. of Lincolnwood,
235 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Calumet Nat’l Bank v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
682 N.E.2d 785, 791–92 (Ind. 1997); Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Whitley County Rural
Elec. Membership Corp., 312 N.E.2d 503, 505, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Athison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Weaver, 10 Kan. 344, 350–52 (1872); Grainland Farms,
Inc. v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 722 P.2d 1125, 1127–29 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); Williams v. City
of Baton Rouge, 731 So. 2d 240, 247–49 (La. 1999); Belgarde v. City of Natchitoches,
156 So. 2d 132, 135–36 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Mullan v. Belbin, 100 A. 384, 389–90 (Md.
1917); Radway v. Selectmen of Dennis, 165 N.E. 410, 411–12 (Mass. 1929); Grand
Rapids, L. & D. R. Co. v. Chesebro, 42 N.W. 66, 67 (Mich. 1889); Berry v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 370 So. 2d 235, 237 (Miss. 1979); Powers v. Hurmert, 51 Mo. 136, 137–38
(1872); Harris v. L. P. & H. Constr. Co., 441 S.W.2d 377, 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); W.
A. Manda, Inc., v. City of Orange, 75 A. 741, 742 (N.J. 1910); City of Worthington v.
Carskadon, 249 N.E.2d 38, 39 (Ohio 1969); Yoder v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co.,
316 N.E.2d 477, 479 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); Kerns v. Couch, 12 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Or.
1932); Hinson v. A. T. Sistare Constr. Co., 113 S.E.2d 341, 343 (S.C. 1960); Walker v.
Hilltop Irrigation, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 521, 523–24 (S.D. 1989); Alexander v. City of San
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accordance with the dictates of law. Therefore, if the state constitution
requires payment of compensation before a taking, the condemnor is a
trespasser if it enters before paying. 31 Even without a prior compensation
requirement, a condemnor is liable for trespass if it enters land before
completing all the condemnation requirements, including exhausting all
appeals. 32 In these jurisdictions, failing to satisfy the legal prerequisites to
a taking is such a serious violation of private property rights that the
condemnor is liable for trespass even if it has sovereign immunity from
trespass claims in other contexts. 33
Antonio, 468 S.W.2d 797, 799–800 (Tex. 1971); Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Watson, 626
S.W.2d 139, 140–41 (Tex. App. 1981); Russell v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 435 P.2d 294,
295 (Utah 1967); Chaffinch v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., Inc., 313 S.E.2d
376, 378–79 (Va. 1984); Handley v. Cook, 252 S.E.2d 147, 148 n.1 (W. Va. 1979);
MARSH & GAMBLE, supra note 11, § 16:59; 1 S.C. LITIGATION FORMS AND ANALYSIS §
3:41 (2007); 32 TEX. JUR. 3D Eminent Domain §§ 120 & 196 (2006).
31.
Chi., St. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Gates, 11 N.E. 527, 528 (Ill. 1887) (“It is a
plain proposition that the railroad company had no right to the possession of the
property until the damages for taking have been assessed and paid, and, when it went
into the possession, it was a trespasser . . . .”); Meeker v. City of Chi., 96 Ill. App. 23, 24
(1900); Mullan v. Belbin, 100 A. 384, 389 (Md. 1917); Harris v. L. P. & H. Constr. Co.,
441 S.W.2d 377, 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (“Under the Missouri law the date of lawful
appropriation is the date upon which the [condemnor] pays the amount of damages
assessed by the commissioners.”); Menge v. Morris & E. R. Co., 67 A. 1028, 1029 (N.J.
Ch. 1907); Yoder, 316 N.E.2d at 479 (“To hold that the existence of the remedy for
damages for such unconstitutional appropriation precludes injunctive relief renders
nugatory the constitutional requirement that the compensation be first made in
money.”).
32.
Thompson, 32 So. 2d at 801–02; Jefferson County, 722 So. 2d at 765;
Larimer County Canal No. 2 Irrigating Co. v. Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co., 143 P.
270, 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 1914); Pettit v. Comm’rs of Wicomico County, 90 A. 993, 996–
97 (Md. 1914); Radway, 165 N.E. at 412; Lexington Print Works v. Town of Canton, 50
N.E. 931, 932 (Mass. 1898); Wilson v. City of Lynn, 119 Mass. 174, 179 (1875); Grand
Rapids, L. & D. R.R. Co., 42 N.W. at 67; Beck v. Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co., 3 So.
252, 253 (Miss. 1887) (“If a company desires the right of way, it must take steps to
secure it. If it does not, it must answer for every invasion of the rights of the landowner.”); Perley v. Town of Effingham, 48 A.2d 484, 486 (N.H. 1946); Brackett v.
Bellows Falls Hydroelectric Corp., 175 A. 822, 823 (N.H. 1934); Newmarket Elec. Co.
v. Chase, 108 A. 382, 384 (N.H. 1919); Menge v. Morris & E. R. Co., 67 A. 1028, 1029
(N.J. Ch. 1907) (granting an injunction to keep condemnors “‘within the strict limits of
their statutory powers, and prevent them from deviating in the smallest degree from
the terms prescribed by the statute which gives them authority’” (quoting WILLIAM
KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS 295 (1880)); Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co. v. A. C. Allen & Sons, 95 S.E. 406, 408 (Va. 1918).
33.
Nika Corp. v. City of Kansas City, 582 F. Supp. 343, 355–56 (W.D. Mo.
1983); Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 783 S.W.2d 53, 56–57 (Ark. 1990); State ex rel.
Smith v. 0.24148 Acres of Land, 171 A.2d 228, 231 (Del. 1961); Town of S. Bethany v.

Burkhart 10.0

2008]

3/24/2008 4:48 PM

Takings and Trespass

351

This judicial insistence on compliance with the legal prerequisites to a
taking is not based on an inflexible interpretation or application of the law.
Rather, courts are concerned with abuses of the taking power:
[A] municipality which appropriates property in violation of the
constitution, without prior judicial authority for the taking, should pay
such trespass damages in a suit by the landowner to recover for this
illegal taking. If in such an instance the landowner should receive only
the value of the land taken, the municipality thus is liable only for the
same amount as if it had expropriated in accordance with law—
indicating, should that be the holding, that the judicial expropriation
proceedings required by the constitution are a useless formality, while
at the same time depriving the landowner of the additional
compensation to which he is entitled as compensatory damages for the
violation of his constitutional property right to be free of unlawful
trespasses upon and takings of his land, whether by the municipality or
by private persons. 34

Often, the courts in these jurisdictions also focus on the inequality of
power between a condemnor and a private landowner. For example, in
Menge v. Morris & E. R.R. Co., a New Jersey court enjoined a railroad’s
trespass to prevent “dangerous aggression” by “‘powerful bodies, which
have often large sums of money at their disposal and are often too prone to
act in an arbitrary and oppressive manner . . . .’” 35 Similarly, in Powers v.
Hurmert, the Missouri Supreme Court held that an owner could sue for a
precondemnation trespass even after accepting compensation for the
taking because:
[T]he taking of private property for public use is in the nature of a
forced sale. The owner is compelled to part with his property at the
price assessed . . . . So in accepting the price which is forced on him he
agrees to nothing, and waives no previous right that may have accrued
Cat Hill Water Co., No. 93C-04-004, 1997 WL 27108, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 7,
1997); Crescenzo v. Newcastle County, 1988 WL 67836, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 7,
1988); Seitz v. A-Del Constr. Co., 1987 WL 16711, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 13,
1987); Duffield v. DeKalb County, 249 S.E.2d 235, 236 (Ga. 1978); Belgarde, 156 So. 2d
at 134–35; Foss v. Me. Tpk. Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 343–44 (Me. 1973); Johnson v. Steele
County, 60 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. 1953); Newman v. St. Louis County, 176 N.W. 191,
191–92 (Minn. 1920); Langdon v. Me.-N.H. Interstate Bridge Auth., 33 A.2d 739, 740–
41 (N.H. 1943).
34.
Belgarde, 156 So. 2d at 135–36.
35.
Menge v. Morris & E. R.R. Co., 67 A. 1028, 1029 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (quoting
KERR, supra note 32, at 295).
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to him . . . . 36

Concerned with this type of abuse, one court took the rather extreme step
of holding that a public utility’s wrongful taking of the plaintiff’s property
revoked the utility’s statutory authority to enter. 37
B. Trespass Action Never Available
In marked contrast, courts in several states hold that a trespass action
is unavailable even when the condemnor knowingly violated the taking
requirements. 38 In some of these jurisdictions, sovereign immunity bars the
trespass action without particular reference to the precondemnation entry
context. 39 However, courts in other jurisdictions do not permit a trespass
action even though sovereign immunity is not a bar. These courts have
adopted one of two lines of reasoning: (1) state sovereignty over property
or (2) preemption of trespass liability.

36.
Powers v. Hurmert, 51 Mo. 136, 137–38 (1872); accord Alexander v. City
of San Antonio, 468 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. 1971) (“‘The law offers no . . . rewards for
wrong-doing.’” (quoting Tex. W. Ry. Co. v. Cave, 15 S.W. 786, 787 (Tex. 1891)));
Lovett v. W. Va. Cent. Gas Co., 65 S.E. 196, 198 (W. Va. 1909) (“‘It is most essential to
the preservation of the rights of private property, to the protection of the citizen, and
to the preservation of the best interests of the community, that all who are invested
with the right of eminent domain, with the extraordinary power of depriving persons . .
. without their consent, of their property, and its possession and enjoyment, should be
kept in strict line of the authority with which they are clothed, and compelled to
implicit obedience to the mandates of the Constitution.’”) (quoting E. & W. R.R. Co.
v. E. Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R. Co., 75 Ala. 275, 281 (1883)).
37.
Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Stevenson, 363 N.E.2d 1254, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977).
38.
Ashley Park Charlotte Assocs. v. City of Charlotte, 827 F. Supp. 1223,
1226 (W.D.N.C. 1993); Mo. & N.A.R. Co. v. Chapman, 234 S.W. 171, 172 (Ark. 1921);
DeBoer v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 109 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); Townsend v.
State ex rel. State Highway Dep’t, 871 P.2d 958, 959–60 (N.M. 1994); T-Wol
Acquisition Co. v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, No. COA05-143, 2006 WL 387955, at *3
(N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2006); Wagner v. Borough of Rainsburg, 714 A.2d 1164, 1166–
67 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998); Brazil v. City of Auburn, 610 P.2d 909, 916 (Wash. 1980);
Benka v. Consol. Water Power Co., 224 N.W. 718, 719–20 (Wis. 1929); Price v.
Marinette & Menominee Paper Co., 221 N.W. 381, 381–82 (Wis. 1928); Negus v.
Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 331 N.W.2d 658, 664–65 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
39.
Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 783 S.W.2d 53, 56–57 (Ark. 1990); Dayton
v. City of Asheville, 115 S.E. 827, 828–29 (N.C. 1923); McAdoo v. City of Greensboro,
372 S.E.2d 742, 744 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).

Burkhart 10.0

2008]
1.

3/24/2008 4:48 PM

Takings and Trespass

353

State Sovereignty

Washington courts deny trespass liability on the basis that the state
government has sovereignty over the property within its borders: “‘The
constitution does not give the right to take; that is inherent in the state.’” 40
Based on this rationale, the courts reject both reasons upon which the
courts in the previous section relied to impose liability. First, the
Washington courts hold that a condemnor acquires title upon entry even if
it has not complied with the legal requirements, including the
constitutionally mandated obligation to pay compensation before taking. 41
Second, Washington courts dismiss the concern that a condemnor will
abuse the taking power. They assume that the sovereign will act only in
good faith.
When taking private property for a public use the state acts in its
sovereign capacity. It goes not as a trespasser inspired by selfish or
unlawful motive, but as one taking without malice or intent to do
wrong, and presumptively for the public good. It cannot put on the
cloak of a tort-feasor under the statute if it would. 42

These justifications for refusing to impose trespass liability are
inadequate. Even accepting that government is not bound by legal
preconditions on taking property, this proposition does not explain why
private condemnors, such as utility companies, are also exempt from
trespass liability. Moreover, the large number of cases in which public and
private condemnors have taken property in bad faith seriously undercuts
the Washington courts’ presumption of good faith. 43 And, in any event,
good faith is not a defense to trespass in any other context. 44
2.

Preemption
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin each allowed a trespass

40.
Brazil, 610 P.2d at 911 (quoting Kincaid v. City of Seattle, 134 P. 504, 506
(Wash. 1913)).
41.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16; Aylmore v. City of Seattle, 171 P. 659, 660
(Wash. 1918) (“We have repeatedly held that a municipality, in taking private property
for public use, acts in its sovereign capacity and not as a trespasser. Having the right to
take, whatever its procedure or lack of procedure, it is not a wrongdoer.”).
42.
Kincaid, 134 P. at 506 (“[W]e know of no law that will impute to the city,
when exercising the sovereign power of the state, a willful intention to disregard the
right of a citizen.”) (citation omitted).
43.
See supra note 15.
44.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
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action for wrongful precondemnation entry until state legislation
authorized an inverse condemnation action. Although none of these
statutes expressly preempted trespass liability, 45 the courts in each state
held that the legislation had that effect. 46 Therefore, inverse condemnation
became the landowner’s exclusive remedy. The Minnesota courts, which
had also allowed a trespass action, reached a similar conclusion based on
an amendment to the state constitution’s taking clause. The Minnesota
and Pennsylvania preemption decisions are clearly incorrect, though for
opposite reasons.
The Minnesota decisions are incorrect because the state
constitutional amendment does not preempt trespass liability for a
precondemnation entry. The Minnesota Constitution originally required
that compensation be paid before property could be “taken.” 47 Courts
interpreted this provision to mean that a condemnor could acquire title
Any entry before the
only in valid condemnation proceedings. 48
49
condemnation proceedings constituted trespass, and the owner could
recover trespass damages—including consequential damages, punitive
damages, 50 and statutory damage multipliers 51 —as well as the land’s value
on the date of the condemnation proceedings. 52
In 1896, the constitution was amended to require compensation when
the land was “taken, destroyed or damaged.” 53 This amendment was
intended to protect landowners by providing compensation for injuries to
45.
N.M. STAT. § 42A-1-29(A) (1994); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-303 (1997),
amended by 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-102 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 32.10 (2006).
46.
Landavazo v. Sanchez, 802 P.2d 1283, 1286 (N.M. 1990); Garver v. Pub.
Serv. Co. of N.M., 421 P.2d 788, 792–94 (N.M. 1966); Fulmer v. White Oak Borough,
606 A.2d 589, 593–94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Grunwaldt v. Modern Wrecking Co., 118
N.W.2d 188, 191 (Wis. 1962); Price v. Marinette & Menominee Paper Co., 221 N.W.
381, 381 (Wis. 1928).
47.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 (amended 1896).
48.
Fish v. Chi., St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co., 87 N.W. 606, 607–08 (Minn. 1901).
49.
Id. at 608; Lamm v. Chi., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 47 N.W. 455, 457 (Minn.
1890); Mathews v. St. Paul & Sioux City R.R. Co., 18 Minn. 434, 440 (1872); Adams v.
Hastings & Dakota R.R. Co., 18 Minn. 260, 265 (1872); Harrington v. St. Paul & Sioux
City R.R. Co., 17 Minn. 215, 220 (1871).
50.
Brantner Farms, Inc. v. Garner, No. C6-01-1572, 2002 WL 1163559, at *2–
5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 2002).
51.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.05 (West 2000).
52.
Brooks Inv. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 232 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Minn.
1975).
53.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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land that had not been appropriated in condemnation proceedings. For
example, land adjoining a highway might be flooded periodically after the
government changed the highway’s grade. Before the amendment, this
type of injury was noncompensable because the land had not been
“taken.” 54
Despite the limited legislative intent to protect adjoining landowners,
the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the amendment more broadly to
diminish the rights of owners whose land was taken. Based on the new
constitutional language, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
condemnor acquired title when it entered the land, rather than in the
subsequent condemnation proceedings, and that the property should be
valued as of the date of entry. 55 With this holding, the court eliminated
condemnors’ trespass liability and changed the date of valuation in a
manner that harms many landowners.
The court reasoned that, by valuing the property on the date of entry,
the condemnor would be required to compensate the owner for any
property damage that it caused before initiating condemnation
proceedings. 56 However, requiring compensation for precondemnation
damage did not benefit landowners, because they formerly could recover
those damages in a trespass action, as well as recovering the other types of
damages that are available in a trespass action but not in a condemnation
action. Moreover, owners no longer are compensated for increases in the
land’s value from the date of entry to the date of the condemnation, though
the period of time between them can be substantial. In light of the
legislative intent to provide greater protection for landowners, the holding
that the constitutional amendment preempted trespass liability is incorrect.
The Pennsylvania decisions concerning preemption of trespass actions
are also incorrect, though for a different reason. When the Pennsylvania
courts determined that the inverse condemnation statute preempted
trespass actions, they created a test for distinguishing between entries that
constitute a taking and those that constitute only a trespass. In the seminal
case on this issue, Fulmer v. White Oak Borough, the court stated that
trespass is the appropriate cause of action if the wrongful entry occurred as

54.
See Henry H. Foster, Jr., Tort Liability Under Damage Clauses, 5 OKLA.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1952); Daniel R. Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional
Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 3, 18.
55.
Brooks Inv. Co., 232 N.W.2d at 920–21.
56.
Id. at 916.
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a result of negligence. 57
If the entry was not negligent, inverse
condemnation is the correct action.
By focusing on negligence, rather than on the condemnor’s wrongful
possession of private land, and by creating a rigid dichotomy between
actions for trespass and inverse condemnation, Pennsylvania courts have
improperly characterized several cases involving a permanent physical
occupation as a trespass and not as a taking. 58 For example, in Enon Valley
Telephone Co. v. Market, the defendant telephone company installed
underground phone cable and telephone poles and lines on the plaintiffs’
land based on an easement document signed by someone other than the
owners. 59 After discovering the error, the defendant did not remove its
equipment or compensate the landowners. 60 Despite the defendant’s
continuing occupation of the land, the court held the plaintiffs’ only cause
of action was for trespass because the defendant had been negligent in its
attempt to acquire an easement. 61
Similarly, in Rawlings v. Bucks County Water and Sewer Authority,
the Authority condemned a portion of the plaintiffs’ land for a pumping
station. 62 The Authority’s contractor negligently built part of the station
on an uncondemned portion of the plaintiffs’ land. 63 The encroachment
destroyed access to the plaintiffs’ remaining property and its intended
residential use. 64 Although the Authority occupied the entire station,
including the part on the uncondemned land, the court held that the
plaintiffs did not have an inverse condemnation action because the
Authority’s occupation of the uncondemned land was attributable to the
contractor’s negligence. 65
57.
Fulmer v. White Oak Borough, 606 A.2d 589, 590 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
58.
Deets v. Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Auth., 479 A.2d 49, 50–52 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1984) (holding that when sanitary authority’s contractor negligently
located sewer line outside easement area, authority was not liable for inverse
condemnation though the public owned and used the sewer line); Lutzko v. Mikris,
Inc., 410 A.2d 370, 372–73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979); Steckley v. Commonwealth, 407
A.2d 79, 80 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
59.
Enon Valley Tel. Co. v. Market, 493 A.2d 800, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985).
60.
Id. at 801.
61.
Id. at 802.
62.
Rawlings v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth., 702 A.2d 583, 584 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997).
63.
Id. at 584.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 586.

Burkhart 10.0

2008]

3/24/2008 4:48 PM

Takings and Trespass

357

These characterizations of a permanent physical occupation as a
trespass, rather than as a taking, violate both the U.S. and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that a
permanent physical occupation constitutes a per se taking under the
federal Constitution. 66 The issue of negligence is irrelevant. The
Pennsylvania Constitution requires prior compensation for a taking. 67 By
treating the wrongful possession as a trespass, rather than as a taking, the
Pennsylvania courts have enabled condemnors to avoid this constitutional
requirement. In this way, the courts have far exceeded the scope of the
preemption doctrine.
C. Trespass Liability for Private Entities but not for Government
In five states, courts distinguish between government and private
entities on the issue of trespass liability for precondemnation entry. These
courts hold that the government is liable only for inverse condemnation but
that a private condemnor is also liable for trespass. 68 In Georgia and in
Iowa, the difference is based on the government’s immunity from tort
liability. 69 In the other jurisdictions—Alaska, New York, and North
Dakota—the difference is based on the source of the entity’s eminent
domain powers. The government’s power is inherent; a private entity’s
power is delegated.
66.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979).
67.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
68.
Fletcher v. Del., L. & W. R.R. Co., 79 F.2d 306, 310 (2d Cir. 1935) (private
entity); Gache v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1049–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(government); Ostrem v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 648 P.2d 986, 989 (Alaska 1982)
(private entity); Wickwire v. City of Juneau, 557 P.2d 783, 784 (Alaska 1976)
(government); Doe v. Ga. R.R. & Banking Co., 1 Ga. 524, 533–37 (1846) (private
entity); Shealy v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke County, 537 S.E.2d 105, 109–10 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2000) (government); Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa, 164 N.W.2d 853,
856–57 (Iowa 1969) (private entity); Gibson v. Union County, 223 N.W. 111, 114 (Iowa
1929) (government); Drady v. Des Moines & Fort Dodge R.R. Co., 10 N.W. 754, 762
(Iowa 1881) (private entity); Feder v. Vill. of Monroe, 725 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (App. Div.
2001) (government); Buholtz v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 339 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779–80 (App.
Div. 1973) (private entity); Adams v. Canterra Petroleum, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 540, 545–46
(N.D. 1989) (private entity); Jacobson v. State, 278 N.W. 652, 653 (N.D. 1938)
(government).
69.
Stanfield v. Glynn County, 631 S.E.2d 374, 377 (Ga. 2006); City of Atlanta
v. Minder, 63 S.E.2d 420, 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951) (municipalities are liable for trespass,
but only if the wrongful conduct constitutes a nuisance or taking, both of which require
a substantial interference with the owner’s property rights); Gibson, 223 N.W. at 114;
Brown v. Davis County, 195 N.W. 363, 366 (Iowa 1923).
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The North Dakota decisions present the clearest example of this
dichotomy. As in Washington, the North Dakota Constitution requires
payment of compensation before a taking, and the courts hold that
government takes land in its sovereign capacity. 70 In holding that a
township was not liable in trespass for building a road across the plaintiff’s
land without paying for it, the North Dakota Supreme Court used language
that is strikingly similar to that of the Washington Supreme Court:
An instrumentality of the state, exercising its right to condemn
property for public use, cannot be said to be a trespasser in the same
sense in which a private corporation entitled to exercise the right of
eminent domain would be a trespasser when the latter goes upon the
land of another and attempts to exercise dominion over it without
compliance with law, even though the township may not have followed
the statutory procedure. “The original and ultimate title to all
property, real or personal, within the limits of this state is in the
state.” 71

However, unlike the Washington Supreme Court, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has properly applied trespass liability doctrine by not
extending government sovereignty to insulate private condemnors from
trespass liability. In marked contrast to its treatment of government
condemnors, the North Dakota courts have dealt quite strictly with private
condemnors. For example, in Donovan v. Allert, the court enjoined a
telephone company from using two poles it had erected on the plaintiff’s
land before condemnation despite the harm to the public and the
“insignificant” harm to the plaintiff. 72
Though their analysis is more opaque, Alaska and New York courts
essentially adhere to the same theory as North Dakota courts. Unlike
North Dakota courts, Alaska and New York courts do not refer to
government “sovereignty.” 73 Instead, they reason that a government
70.
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16; Johnson v. Wells County Water Res. Bd., 410
N.W.2d 525, 527 (N.D. 1987).
71.
Schilling v. Carl Twp., 235 N.W. 126, 129 (N.D. 1931) (quoting Section 8
COMP. LAWS 1913 POL. CODE); accord Jacobson, 278 N.W. at 653 (holding government
is not liable for trespass for a precondemnation entry because, when it entered, it was
acting “in its sovereign capacity, and not as a trespasser”). Contra Williams v. City of
Fargo, 247 N.W. 46, 52 (N.D. 1933) (stating that plaintiff “is entitled to recover . . . any
and all damages” associated with private property taken for public use “as when caused
by trespass or physical invasion of the property”).
72.
Donovan v. Allert, 91 N.W. 441, 446–47 (N.D. 1902).
73.
See infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
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entity’s precondemnation entry constitutes an exercise of its eminent
domain power, rather than a trespass. 74 As the Alaska Supreme Court
explained in State v. Crosby:
When the state appropriated appellees’ land for the construction
of a highway, it was exercising the power of eminent domain. It is true
that the state did not utilize condemnation proceedings prescribed by
law and by rule. . . . Such action was still the exercise of the power of
eminent domain because private property was being taken by the state
for a public use. 75

In a number of cases, New York courts also cite the government’s
eminent domain power when holding that government condemnors are not
liable for trespass: “‘Inverse condemnation, rather than trespass, is the
appropriate theory for granting damages to an injured landowner where
the trespasser is cloaked with the power of eminent domain.’” 76 In other
cases involving a government condemnor, New York courts have used the
circular logic that “‘[a]n entry cannot be both a trespass and a taking
because, in the latter instance, the condemnor acquires ownership.’” 77 In
one particularly unvarnished opinion, a New York court stated that courts
have denied trespass actions against government condemnors as a
“procedural vehicle” to avoid granting injunctive relief when the wrongful
possession provides a public good, such as sewer service. 78
A substantial problem with the Alaska and New York courts’
rationales is that they apply with equal force to private condemnors. When
a private condemnor enters another’s land, it enters pursuant to its eminent
domain power. When it permanently occupies land, such as with a railroad
line, it effectively has taken the land. Refusing to enjoin a wrongful entry
by a private condemnor, such as a utility company, often serves the public
interest.
What is the basis then for the Alaska and New York courts’
distinction between public and private condemnors? The answer lies in the
respective sources of their eminent domain powers. The Alaska and New
74.
See infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
75.
State v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724, 728 (Alaska 1966) (footnote omitted).
76.
Clempner v. Town of Southold, 546 N.Y.S.2d 101, 105 (App. Div. 1989)
(quoting Tuffley v. City of Syracuse, 442 N.Y.S.2d 326, 330 (App. Div. 1981)).
77.
Gache v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(quoting Carr v. Town of Fleming, 504 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (App. Div. 1986)); see also
Feder v. Vill. of Monroe, 725 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (App. Div. 2001).
78.
Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200–01 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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York courts hold that a private condemnor is liable for trespass when it
violates the scope of its delegated eminent domain power. 79 By failing to
follow the prescribed procedures, such as initiating a condemnation
proceeding, the entity exceeded its authority and was a wrongdoer—a
trespasser. 80 As stated by a New York court in a case involving a railroad’s
precondemnation entry:
If a railroad company, impelled by its interests or exigencies, sees
fit to enter upon and take possession of, and use and appropriate, the
lands and growing crops and timber, of a citizen, against his consent,
and before having acquired the right to do so by the exercise of the
delegated right of eminent domain, they do so under the same
liabilities and responsibility for their acts which would be incurred by
any private individual who should do the same acts. 81

By negative implication, the government’s eminent domain power is
not delegated to it but is an inherent power. Thus, the New York and
Alaska decisions are based on the same government sovereignty rationale
as the North Dakota decisions. The government is not bound by the
eminent domain laws because it is the ultimate owner of the land within its
borders. However, this distinction undoubtedly provides little comfort to a
landowner who has been denied trespass damages because the condemnor
was a government, rather than a private, entity.
D. Alternative Causes of Action
A landowner can sue for trespass or for inverse condemnation but not
for both in Idaho, 82 Nebraska, 83 and Tennessee. 84 Courts in these states
79.
Ostrem v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 648 P.2d 986, 989 (Alaska 1982)
(pipeline company’s “statutory authority does not extend so far as to immunize it from
liability for trespass if it has not initiated eminent domain proceedings”); Blodgett v.
Utica & Black River R.R. Co., 64 Barb. 580, 582 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1873) (plaintiff has a
trespass action if company enters property prior to payment); Griswold v. Minneapolis,
Saint P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 97 N.W. 538, 540–41 (N.D. 1903) (defendant declined to
use eminent domain power and, therefore, was liable for trespass); Donovan v. Allert,
91 N.W. 441, 445–46 (N.D. 1902) (payment must precede taking or damaging,
otherwise plaintiff has a cause of action).
80.
E.g., Salesian Soc’y, Inc. v. Vill. of Ellenville, 505 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198–99
(App. Div. 1986) (holding defendant liable for trespass even though it occupied
plaintiff’s property as the result of a good faith mistake); Kupersmidt v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
282 N.Y.S.2d 605, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (awarding $100 damages for the defendants’
trespass, which was the result of “good, if misdirected, faith”).
81.
Blodgett, 64 Barb. at 588–89.
82.
Boise Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 105 P. 1070, 1073–74 (Idaho 1909).
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allow a trespass action for precondemnation entry for the same reason that
other jurisdictions allow it—to protect private property rights from abuses
of the taking power:
We have endeavored in a long line of cases in this state to make it so
plain that every one may know and understand that property rights in
Idaho are sacred, and that it does not make a particle of difference
whether it be of the value of a dollar or a million; it must, in the
ultimate judgment of the court, all amount to the same thing in the
matter of its protection and preservation to its owner. 85

However, these states differ in their reasons for treating trespass and
inverse condemnation as alternative actions. In Tennessee, a statute
expressly provides that they are alternative. 86 Nebraska has a similar
statute, 87 but its courts had treated the actions as being alternative even
before the statute’s enactment. The courts’ rationale was to give
landowners the option of avoiding the burden of pursuing an inverse
condemnation action. 88
Unlike Tennessee and Nebraska, the Idaho rule is not unique to
precondemnation entries. The Idaho courts rely on the usual rule
concerning an injured party’s right to choose its remedy. For example, in a
case involving a railroad that built its line on the plaintiff’s land before
condemning it, the Idaho Supreme Court analogized the case to an action
for conversion of personal property:
If A. steals B.’s horse, B. may pursue the property in claim and
delivery, or he may waive the tort and sue as upon contract for the
83.
Dishman v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 482 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Neb. 1992)
(citing Slusarski v. County of Platte, 416 N.W.2d 213 (Neb. 1987)); Parriott v. Drainage
Dist. No. 6 of Peru, 410 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Neb. 1987) (citing City of Omaha v. Matthews,
248 N.W.2d 761 (Neb. 1977)).
84.
Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 640–41 (Tenn.
1996); Betty v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 835 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1992).
85.
Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land & Water Co., 118 P. 769, 772 (Idaho 1911);
see also Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 160 P. 265, 268–69 (Idaho 1916)
(defendant is “a naked trespasser”); Republican Valley R.R. Co. v. Fink, 24 N.W. 439,
441 (Neb. 1885) (“The corporation must see to it . . . before it enters upon the land of
another . . . that it has so far complied with the [condemnation] statute as to possess the
authority. If it has not, it is, like any other trespasser, liable in damages.”).
86.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-123 (2000).
87.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-705 (LexisNexis 2004).
88.
Fink, 24 N.W. at 441.
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reasonable value of the animal, and A. will not be heard, in a court of
justice, to answer and deny the contract and set up as a defense that he
stole the animal. So, in a case of this kind, if A. should seize and
appropriate B.’s real estate for an easement authorized under the
Constitution and statute of the state, B. may maintain his action to
oust and eject the trespasser, or he may enjoin him from using and
occupying the land, or he may waive both such remedies and sue upon
an implied contract to pay reasonable compensation for the property
taken. 89

The election between trespass and inverse condemnation would be
primarily of academic interest if the courts in these three states employed
the usual measure of damages for these causes of action. Normally, the
plaintiff in either type of action can recover the difference in the land’s fair
market value before and after entry. 90 But Tennessee, Nebraska, and
Idaho each have different remedies for trespass and inverse condemnation.
In Nebraska, owners bringing a trespass action can recover damages
only for the injuries caused by the trespass. To recover the land’s value,
the owner must bring an inverse condemnation action 91 or wait for a
condemnation action. However, a court will enjoin the condemnor’s use of
the land until it pays compensation. 92
In contrast, a Tennessee court will not eject the condemnor. 93 The
owner can only recover damages, and the amounts differ between the two
causes of action. 94 In a trespass action, the damages are the difference in
the land’s value before and after the entry, consequential damages, 95 and
punitive damages. 96 In an inverse condemnation action, the owner can
only recover the difference of the land’s value before and after entry. 97
Although the trespass action appears to be a better option for the owner,
89.
Boise Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 105 P. 1070, 1074 (Idaho 1909).
90.
POWELL, supra note 2, § 64A.05.
91.
Fink, 24 N.W. at 442.
92.
Id. at 441 (citing Ray v. Atchison & Neb. R.R. Co., 4 Neb. 439 (1876);
Omaha & N.W. R.R. Co. v. Menk, 4 Neb. 21 (1875)).
93.
Zirkle v. City of Kingston, 396 S.W.2d 356, 362 (Tenn. 1965); Tenn. Coal,
Iron & R.R. Co. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transp. Co., 160 S.W. 522, 523–24 (Tenn.
1913).
94.
Zirkle, 396 S.W.2d at 362–63.
95.
Betty v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 835 S.W.2d 1, 6–7
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
96.
Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 642 (Tenn. 1996).
97.
Betty, 835 S.W.2d at 7.

Burkhart 10.0

2008]

3/24/2008 4:48 PM

Takings and Trespass

363

Tennessee courts have indicated that, in some circumstances, the owner
could receive less in a trespass action: “Property owners may recover for
the diminished value of their property or for the cost of repairs, whichever
is less.” 98
In light of the different remedies these jurisdictions offer for trespass
and for inverse condemnation, why do courts require an owner to choose
between them? Normally, an injured party has to choose because the
remedies are inconsistent. For example, in the Idaho Supreme Court’s
analogy concerning the stolen horse, the owner could recover the horse or
its value but not both. 99 However, the remedies for trespass and for inverse
condemnation in these jurisdictions are not inconsistent; rather, they
compensate owners for different aspects of the injury caused by the
precondemnation entry. Therefore, courts in these states should allow an
injured owner to bring both claims in the same lawsuit in order to
adjudicate the entire controversy.
E. Trespass Action Available in Limited Circumstances
In two jurisdictions, a trespass action is available for a
precondemnation entry only in limited circumstances. 100 In Oklahoma, the
determinative factor is whether the wrongful entry occurred in good
faith. 101 In Florida, it is whether the trespass claim is asserted in a
condemnation action or in an inverse condemnation action. 102 The focus
on good faith has intuitive appeal, and the focus on the form of action has
98.
Id. (citing Killian v. Campbell, 760 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988);
Fuller v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 545 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975)).
99.
Boise Valley Constr. v. Kroeger, 105 P. 1070, 1074 (Idaho 1909).
100.
In Florida, trespass claims are unavailable in inverse condemnation
actions but are available as a sole cause of action or in a condemnation action. See, e.g.,
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Stahl, 558 So. 2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(inverse condemnation); City of Miami v. Osborne, 55 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 1951)
(trespass only); Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 10 So. 465, 467–68 (Fla.
1891) (condemnation). In Oklahoma, trespass actions are unavailable if entry was
made in good faith and under color of authority or when a taking effectively takes
adjoining property. See Root v. Kamo Elec. Coop., Inc., 699 P.2d 1083, 1090–91 (Okla.
1985); Allen v. Transok Pipe Line Co., 552 P.2d 375, 379 (Okla. 1976); Cox Enters.,
Ltd. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 550 P.2d 1324, 1326–27 (Okla. 1976).
101.
See Root, 699 P.2d at 1090 (indicating that a trespass action may only be
maintained in limited circumstances, such as when an entry is willful and wanton).
102.
See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Walker, 440 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (a trespass counterclaim was available to appellees in a condemnation
action); Stahl, 558 So. 2d at 1088 (a trespass claim can be brought with an inverse
condemnation claim, but each will be examined separately under the evidence given).
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theoretical appeal. However, both approaches are unsatisfactory responses
to the trespass liability issue.
1.

Good Faith Entry

In Oklahoma, a condemnor is liable for trespass only if it knew that it
did not have the right to enter. 103 The courts have not articulated a clear
reason for limiting the trespass action in this way. Although the notion of
imposing tort liability only on an intentional wrongdoer is appealing,
trespass liability has never been limited in this way. Moreover, a
landowner probably does not care about the trespasser’s state of mind.
The landowner’s injuries are the same.
The seminal Oklahoma case on this issue is Allen v. Transok Pipe
Line Co., in which the defendant laid a pipe line across the plaintiff’s
property without condemning it. 104 The plaintiff sued for trespass and
sought compensatory and punitive damages and the removal of the line. 105
The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s sole remedy was compensation
for inverse condemnation. 106 Its argument was based on a state statutory
provision that, in a case of precondemnation entry, “the damage thereby
inflicted upon the owner of such land shall be determined in the manner
provided . . . for condemnation proceedings.” 107
Contrary to holdings of courts in other jurisdictions that had
interpreted similar language, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that this
provision did not preclude a trespass action. 108 The court stated that,
because the Oklahoma Constitution requires payment of compensation
before a taking, entry before payment is without right and, therefore,
constitutes trespass. 109 The court then said that interpreting the statute to
preclude a trespass action would render the statute unconstitutional. 110
The court supported its holding by citing concerns that a contrary ruling
would encourage unlawful entries and would shift the burden of litigation

103.
See Root, 699 P.2d at 1090 (indicating that a trespass action may only be
maintained in limited circumstances, such as when an entry is willful and wanton).
104.
Allen v. Transok Pipe Line Co., 552 P.2d 375, 377 (Okla. 1976).
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 57 (West 1995).
108.
Allen, 552 P.2d at 379–80.
109.
Id. at 381–82.
110.
Id. at 379.
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to the landowner. 111 The court opined that the legislature intended the
statutory damages provision to apply only when those damages would
compensate the landowner for all its injuries. 112
Unfortunately, the court did not stop there.
Although it
characterized the defendant’s entry as willful and wanton, it stated in
dictum that a trespass action is unavailable when “the entry is unknowing,
is under a mistaken belief of authority, or where the effect of taking other
property has in effect taken adjoining property.” 113 This statement
squarely conflicts with the court’s earlier categorical statement that an
entry before payment constitutes trespass. Despite this evident conflict,
the court does not explain its rationale for creating these exceptions to
trespass liability.
Subsequent Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions have exacerbated
the problem by expanding the scope of this dictum. Oklahoma courts now
routinely hold that a trespass action is available only if “the entry was
willful and wanton and without color of authority.” 114 In this way, the
Oklahoma case law has strayed a long way from the original—and
correct—proposition in the Allen decision that precondemnation entry
constitutes a trespass regardless of the condemnor’s good or bad faith.
2.

Trespass Claim Available Only in Condemnation Action

In Florida, the courts have allowed recovery of trespass damages in
condemnation actions but not in inverse condemnation actions. The courts
have not articulated this distinction as the reason for allowing trespass
damages in some cases but not in others, but the outcomes in the cases are
consistent with it. For example, in County of Volusia v. Pickens, the
landowner brought a successful inverse condemnation case against the
111.
Id. (“To hold otherwise would give this Court’s stamp of approval to [the
pipeline company’s] position that it could take whatever land it desired for pipeline
purposes, and regardless of its failure or refusal to follow the procedural steps required
by law, the only sanction permitted, regardless of its contempt for the rights of the
landowner, is that it might ultimately have to pay the fair market value of the land
taken—assuming the landowner undertakes the burden of prosecuting a reverse
condemnation action.”).
112.
Id. (stating that the intent of the reverse condemnation statute is “to
provide a remedy in those cases where the remedy provided by reverse condemnation
is adequate”).
113.
Id.
114.
Root v. Kamo Elec. Coop., Inc., 699 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Okla. 1985); see also
Cox Enters., Ltd. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 550 P.2d 1324, 1327 (Okla. 1976).
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county. 115 The court denied the owner’s claim for trespass damages from
the date of entry until the date of the inverse condemnation action because
the owner “suffered his loss of the property [upon entry], and thereafter it
belonged (albeit wrongfully appropriated) to the county.” 116 In marked
contrast, the Florida courts have consistently awarded trespass damages for
precondemnation entry when the landowner counterclaimed for them in a
condemnation action. 117
This distinction is consistent with the underlying legal differences
between inverse condemnation and condemnation actions. In an inverse
condemnation action, the landowner is claiming that the condemnor took
the property when it entered and is suing for compensation for the
property. In contrast, in a condemnation action, the condemnor is suing to
acquire title. Therefore, if the condemnor is already in possession of the
property, it is doing so without legal right—it is a trespasser.
Although this distinction may be satisfactory as a matter of legal
theory, it does not address the underlying reality of precondemnation
entry. The entry was wrongful whether the subsequent judicial action is for
inverse condemnation or for condemnation. Moreover, this distinction
creates the perverse incentive of discouraging the condemnor from filing a
condemnation action. If the condemnor waits for an inverse condemnation
suit, rather than filing a condemnation action as it is required to do, the
landowner’s recovery will often be less. Furthermore, the possibility exists
that the landowner will not undertake the burden of filing an action,
meaning the condemnor never has to pay for the land. For these reasons,
trespass damages should be available in both types of actions.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
A court’s decision concerning the availability of a trespass action for
precondemnation entry has substantial practical implications for the
115.
County of Volusia v. Pickens, 439 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
116.
Id. at 278; accord S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Steadman Stahl, P.A.
Pension Fund, 558 So. 2d 1087, 1087–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (landowners
successfully sued District for inverse condemnation; court denied trespass damages
because District acquired title upon entry).
117.
City of Miami v. Osborne, 55 So. 2d 120, 122 (Fla. 1951) (rent for
precondemnation entry included in condemnation award); Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry.
Co. v. Adams, 10 So. 465, 472 (Fla. 1891); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Walker, 440 So. 2d
659, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Fla. Power Corp. v. Scudder, 350 So. 2d 106, 110
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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parties. That decision determines a variety of significant remedy issues
including the valuation date for determining just compensation, the ability
to recover interest on the compensation award or the property’s rental
value, and the availability of ejectment and injunctive relief. In deciding
these issues, the key consideration for a court usually is the date on which it
treats the condemnor as acquiring title—upon entry or in the
condemnation proceedings. Put differently, the issue is whether the court
treats the condemnor who enters before condemnation as a purchaser that
is in default on its obligation to pay the purchase price or as a possessor
that has not yet acquired title. Like the case law concerning the possible
causes of action for precondemnation entry, the judicial decisions
concerning these remedies often conflict even within a jurisdiction.
A. Valuation Date
The most controversial remedy issue is the property’s valuation date
to determine the amount of compensation for the taking. Each jurisdiction
generally chooses one of two dates—the date of the condemnor’s entry or
the date of the condemnation proceedings. 118 Although exceptions exist,
courts in jurisdictions that treat the condemnor as acquiring title upon
entry usually value the property as of that date. 119 Conversely, if the court
holds that the condemnor did not acquire title until the condemnation
proceedings, the court values the property as of that date. 120 In the latter
jurisdictions, a court usually ignores the effects of the condemnor’s
precondemnation activities in determining the land’s value—the
condemnor’s improvements do not increase the property’s value and the
118.
A few courts use the date of entry when the condemnor is a public entity
and the date of the condemnation action when it is private. Compare ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 18-15-410 (2003) (public), with Mo. & N.A.R. Co. v. Chapman, 234 S.W. 171, 173
(Ark. 1921) (private); compare Hurley v. State, 134 N.W.2d 782, 784–85 (S.D. 1965)
(public), with Johnson v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 143 N.W. 959, 963 (S.D. 1913)
(private).
119.
N.M. STAT. § 42A-1-29 (1994); Wickwire v. City & Borough of Juneau,
557 P.2d 783, 784–85 (Alaska 1976); Brooks Inv. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 232
N.W.2d 911, 919 (Minn. 1975); Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. Thoeny, 101 P.3d 430, 438–40
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
120.
Gully v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 774 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (5th Cir. 1985); Shealy
v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke County, 537 S.E.2d 105, 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000);
Wehrum v. Vill. of Lincolnwood, 235 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); County of
Clark v. Alper, 685 P.2d 943, 949 (Nev. 1984); Johnson, 143 N.W. at 963–64; Alexander
v. City of San Antonio, 468 S.W.2d 797, 799–800 (Tex. 1971); White v. State Highway
Comm’r, 114 S.E.2d 614, 616–17 (Va. 1960); W. Va. Dept. of Highways v. Roda, 352
S.E.2d 134, 139–40 (W. Va. 1986).
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damages it caused do not decrease the value. 121
Courts that value land as of the date of the condemnation proceeding
often emphasize that a taking cannot occur until then and that the
condemnor has a duty to comply with the legal requirements. The decision
in West Virginia Department of Highways v. Roda 122 represents an extreme
example of this approach. In Roda, the State Department of Highways,
knowing that it did not have title to the plaintiffs’ land, authorized a
contractor to excavate and sell coal from the land. 123 In a subsequent
condemnation action, the court valued the excavated coal as personal
property as of the date of the action. 124 The court did not allow an offset
for the costs of mining, excavating, removing, and marketing the coal. 125 In
adopting this approach, the court strongly affirmed the condemnor’s
constitutional duty to comply with the taking laws:
The Department of Highways contends that the landowners have
unjustly benefited by a valuation date [based on the filing of the
condemnation action]. Where do the equities lie? The Department of
Highways could have adhered to the statutory mandates of [the
Eminent Domain Code] by condemning the coal prior to its
appropriation and thus fixing its value prior to the actual removal. The
entire conflict could have been avoided had the Department of
Highways adhered to the statutory mandates by condemning the coal
before appropriating it. 126

For these same reasons, some courts hold that the landowner owns
improvements that the condemnor made to the land before acquiring it and
is entitled to compensation for them. 127 For example, in Village of St.
Johnsville v. Smith, the court held that the landowner had title to
waterworks that the Village installed on his property without condemning
it:
121.
E.g., Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 10 So. 465, 467–68 (Fla.
1891); Berry v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 370 So. 2d 235, 236–37 (Miss. 1979); Chase v.
Sch. Dist. No. 10, 30 P. 757, 757–58 (Utah 1892).
122.
W. Va. Dept. of Highways v. Roda, 352 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 1986).
123.
Id. at 136.
124.
Id. at 136–37.
125.
Id. at 139.
126.
Id. at 141.
127.
E.g., Salesian Soc’y, Inc. v. Vill. of Ellenville, 505 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App.
Div. 1986) (citations omitted). Contra Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 10
So. 465, 467 (Fla. 1891); Berry v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 370 So. 2d 235, 237 (Miss.
1979); Chase v. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 30 P. 757, 757–58 (Utah 1892).
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If you invade land without legal right and place structures of a
permanent character thereon, those structures belong to the
landowner. There is no more harshness in applying the rule to one
class of trespassers than to the other. In both cases its application
tends to prevent the perpetration of a wrong. Its operation in this state
has been, and will undoubtly continue to be, most salutary in
constraining those municipal and other corporations which the state
has authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain not to assume
the possession of lands in advance of any right so to do, and thus
practically nullify, during the period of unlawful possession, that
provision of the Constitution which guarantees the citizen against
being deprived of his property for public use without just
compensation. 128

In marked contrast to Roda and Smith, some courts that treat title as
transferring only upon condemnation nevertheless value the property as of
the date of entry. Some of these courts chose that date because the
owner’s inverse condemnation action accrued then. 129 Other courts have
adopted the more comprehensive analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court in
State v. Stumbo. 130
In Stumbo, the State Highway Commission built a highway across the
Stumbos’ land, but neither the Commission nor the Stumbos were aware
that the highway was located on the Stumbos’ land. 131 Ten years later,
when the Stumbos discovered the trespass and asserted their ownership
rights, the Commission unsuccessfully negotiated with them to acquire the
property. 132 The Stumbos then subdivided the land on which the highway
was located into four-inch-square parcels and offered them for sale. 133
Strangely, they were able to sell about 290 of them. 134 In the subsequent
condemnation action, the Stumbos argued that their land should be valued
as of the date of the action based on the sales prices for the “lots in their

128.
Vill. of St. Johnsville v. Smith, 77 N.E. 617, 620 (N.Y. 1906).
129.
E.g., Jones v. New Orleans & Selma R.R. Co. & Immigration Ass’n, 70
Ala. 227, 233–34 (1881); Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. City of Seaford, 523 A.2d 973,
975 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987) (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943));
Grainland Farms, Inc. v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 722 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986)
(citing K.S.A. 26-513(b), (c)).
130.
State v. Stumbo, 352 P.2d 478 (Or. 1960).
131.
Id. at 479.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
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subdivision.” 135
Under Oregon law, the Commission had been a trespasser during the
years before the condemnation action—it could acquire title only by
bringing a condemnation action and by depositing the required
compensation into court. 136 Nevertheless, the court held that the land
should be valued as of the date of entry. 137 To support its holding, the
court made a number of arguments that fall into two categories. Neither
set of arguments justifies the holding.
The first category concerns a condemnor’s and an owner’s respective
rights in the land before condemnation. Although a taking requires a
condemnation proceeding and payment of compensation, the court said
that, “[i]n a practical sense,” the taking occurs when the condemnor
enters. 138 The court supported this conclusion by stating that, after entry,
the owner can no longer use the property and cannot enjoin or eject the
condemnor if it is willing to condemn the property. 139
This reasoning is circular. As a matter of law, the owner is unable to
reclaim possession only if the court holds that it is unable to reclaim
possession. In many other jurisdictions, courts eject or enjoin a trespassing
condemnor. Some courts even order a condemnor, such as a utility or a
railroad, to remove its improvements, even if the landowner cannot prove
any significant harm and the public will suffer substantial harm. Some of
these courts reason that refusing to grant ejectment would be
unconstitutional. 140 Thus, a court has the power—and perhaps the
constitutional obligation—to order the trespasser to leave the property.
The Stumbo court’s second category of arguments is even less
persuasive. These arguments concern the inverse condemnation process.
The court first correctly noted that land values can increase or decrease

135.
Id.
136.
Id. at 480–81.
137.
Id. at 485.
138.
Id. at 483.
139.
Id.
140.
See, e.g., Dulin v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 80 S.E. 145, 145 (W. Va. 1913)
(“[C]ounsel for defendants insist that, after a railroad company has entered upon land,
under a claim of right, and constructed its road, and is operating it, ejectment does not
lie. But we do not assent to this broad proposition. That is not the law of this state.
Such a rule would be contrary to the landowner’s constitutional right. It would be
taking a man’s land, not only without his consent, but also without due process; in fact,
without any legal process whatever.”).
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over time. 141 Therefore, neither valuation date inherently favors the owner
or the condemnor. The court then stated that, because the date of entry is
a fixed date, “[t]here will be no motive on either side to drag out
negotiations in the hope of a favorable moment to demand condemnation;
and settlement of claims rather than litigation will be encouraged.” 142
By choosing the date of entry as the valuation date, the court created
a perverse incentive of a different sort for the condemnor. Because the
compensation amount will not vary, the condemnor’s economic incentive
also will not vary. When the amount of the condemnor’s liability is
established as of the date of its entry, it has little motivation to commence
condemnation proceedings and pay the compensation, particularly because
the court will not eject it from the land. Therefore, to recover the
compensation it is due, the landowner will have to commence an inverse
condemnation action.
This result is contrary to the usual judicial principle that a landowner
should not have to bear the burden of initiating an inverse condemnation
action. 143 As the Nebraska Supreme Court stated:
The law does not require the citizen to institute proceedings to protect
his rights, but merely permits him to do so. Constitutional guaranties
of the rights of property would be of very little value if a corporation
could seize the property of an individual and say to the owner, “If you
want compensation for this property, institute proceedings to condemn
it, and after we think the proper amount is awarded we will pay
you.” 144

Courts have expressed particular concern about the legal fees that an
owner will incur in an inverse condemnation action. If the condemnor
initiates the process to acquire the property by negotiation or by
141.
Stumbo, 352 P.2d at 483.
142.
Id.
143.
Beck v. Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co., 3 So. 252, 253 (Miss. 1887) (“The
fact that the [railroad] charter authorizes either the land-owner or the company to
institute proceedings for condemnation does not in any manner abridge the rights of
the land-owner. He is not bound to take the initiative as to such proceedings.”); Steven
D. McGrew, Note, Selected Issues in Federal Condemnations for Underground Natural
Gas Storage Rights: Valuation Methods, Inverse Condemnation, and Trespass, 51 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 131, 174 (2000) (“The burden of moving the process forward should be
on the storage operator, not the landowner. A property owner does not need to earn
the right to be justly compensated for the taking of his property—that right is
guaranteed by the Constitution.”).
144.
Republican Valley R.R. Co. v. Fink, 24 N.W. 439, 441 (Neb. 1885).
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condemnation, the landowner would not require legal representation,
though it would be prudent. In contrast, the landowner will normally need
an attorney’s services to bring an inverse condemnation action. 145 In the
worst-case scenario, this burden will prevent the landowner from bringing
an action, and the condemnor will get the land without paying any
compensation. 146 To avoid this result, some courts award attorney’s fees to
a landowner in an inverse condemnation action, though they are
unavailable in a condemnation action. 147
The court in Stumbo turned this judicial principle on its head. The
court said a landowner who fails to bring an inverse condemnation action
“is hardly less at fault than the trespasser” who failed to bring a
condemnation action and that “[o]ne who has suffered substantial loss will
not suffer in silence.” 148 Therefore, the court treats an owner who does not
bring an inverse condemnation action as being “at fault” and recognizes
the potential for the owner’s “substantial loss.” 149
Contrary to the Stumbo court’s holding, valuing property as of the
date of the condemnation proceeding better satisfies the practical and
theoretical reasons for recognizing a trespass action for precondemnation
entry. Regardless of whether land values are increasing or decreasing, the
condemnor will have a substantial economic incentive to bring a
condemnation proceeding before entering. When values are increasing,
which is more usual, the condemnor will want to bring condemnation
proceedings as soon as possible. Even if land values are decreasing, the
condemnor will be motivated to bring a timely condemnation action to
avoid paying rent for the period of precondemnation trespass, as described
in the next section.
B. Interest v. Rental Value
When a condemnor possesses land before paying for it, courts often
order compensation for more than just the land’s value. The condemnor
may have to pay interest on the compensation award from the date of
entry. Alternatively, it may have to pay the property’s rental value for that
period.
145.
See Landavazo v. Sanchez, 802 P.2d 1283, 1287–88 (N.M. 1990)
(Montgomery, J., concurring).
146.
Allen v. Transok Pipe Line Co., 552 P.2d 375, 379 (Okla. 1976).
147.
See Landavazo, 802 P.2d at 1287–89 (Montgomery, J., concurring).
148.
State v. Stumbo, 352 P.2d 478, 483 (Or. 1960).
149.
Id.
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The court’s decision whether to award interest or rent is normally
based on the same consideration as its decision concerning the property’s
valuation date—the time when the condemnor acquired title. Courts that
treat the condemnor as acquiring title upon entry often award interest 150
but not rent. 151 Essentially, the court is holding the condemnor liable for
interest on its deferred payment of the land’s purchase price. Conversely,
if the condemnor does not acquire title until the condemnation
proceedings, courts may require payment of rent for the period of the
condemnor’s precondemnation possession. 152
Despite the logical consistency of these holdings, some courts have
adopted a different rule. Though they hold that the condemnor was a
trespasser before the condemnation proceedings, they award interest,
rather than rent. Some of these courts characterize the interest as a
substitute for rent. 153 Others characterize it as compensation for the time
value of the money the condemnor should have paid before entry. 154 Both
rationales are flawed.
The long established measure of damages for a trespasser’s possession
is the land’s rental value, rather than interest on the compensation
award. 155 Even when a court characterizes the interest as a rent substitute,
it is an inadequate substitute. A substantial likelihood exists that the
interest amount will bear little, if any, relation to the land’s rental value.
Therefore, it will not constitute just compensation for the
precondemnation possession.

150.
E.g., N.M. STAT. § 42A-1-29 (1994); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 514(A)
(McKinney 2003); Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 345 S.E.2d 355, 359 (N.C. 1986);
Okla. City v. Wells, 91 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Okla. 1939); Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. Thoeny,
101 P.3d 430, 439–40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
151.
E.g., County of Volusia v. Pickens, 439 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 304 S.E.2d 164, 176–77 (N.C. 1983); Brazil v.
City of Auburn, 610 P.2d 909, 914 (Wash. 1980).
152.
E.g., Salesian Soc’y, Inc. v. Vill. of Ellenville, 505 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (App.
Div. 1986).
153.
E.g., Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Ariz.
1993); Garden Water Corp. v. Fambrough, 53 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Stumbo, 352 P.2d at 483.
154.
E.g., Jones v. New Orleans & Selma R.R. Co. & Immigration Ass’n, 70
Ala. 227, 234 (1881); Orono-Veazie Water Dist. v. Penobscot County Water Co., 348
A.2d 249, 257–58 (Me. 1975); County of Clark v. Alper, 685 P.2d 943, 949–50 (Nev.
1984); Wright v. Pemigewasset Power Co., 70 A. 290, 291–92 (N.H. 1908); Wells, 91
P.2d at 1086.
155.
See, e.g., Salesian Soc’y, Inc., 505 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
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Moreover, the statutorily prescribed interest rate on the
compensation award may be inappropriate as a measure of damages even
when interest, rather than rent, is the proper damage award. 156 With
fluctuations in market interest rates, the statutory rate may vary
substantially from the current rate. Therefore, to guarantee that an owner
receives its constitutionally mandated just compensation, courts should
award interest at the current market rate, rather than at the statutory rate.
C. Ejectment and Injunctive Relief
Rather than recovering damages, many owners would prefer to regain
exclusive possession of their land. The owner’s ability to do so depends on
whether a trespass action is available. In jurisdictions where inverse
condemnation is the sole remedy, ejectment is unavailable if the
condemnor has already entered. 157 However, if the condemnor has not yet
entered, courts in these jurisdictions will enjoin it from doing so until it
pays for the land. 158
In marked contrast, courts that allow a trespass action often grant
ejectment or injunctive relief and are far more liberal in doing so than they
are in other contexts. 159 Despite the usual legal prerequisites, many courts
have granted these remedies though the owner had an adequate remedy at
law 160 and could not demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm
otherwise. 161 For example, in Lovett v. West Virginia Central Gas Co., a gas
company condemned an eighteen-inch strip of the plaintiff’s land to lay
156.
Lea Co., 345 S.E.2d at 358–59 (“[C]ompensation for delay in payment is a
part of just compensation . . . . Several jurisdictions have applied an interest rate set by
statute if that interest rate satisfies the requirement that just compensation be paid for
a taking . . . . The statutory rate is presumptively reasonable, but the landowner may
rebut the rate’s reasonableness by introducing evidence of prevailing market rates.”).
157.
Landavazo v. Sanchez, 802 P.2d 1283, 1287 (N.M. 1990) (Montgomery, J.,
concurring).
158.
Austin v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 895 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Ark. 1995);
Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. Thoeny, 101 P.3d 430, 436 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
159.
However, the court may stay the remedy to allow the trespasser time to
condemn the land. E.g., Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 10 So. 465, 472
(Fla. 1891); Griswold v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 97 N.W. 538, 541 (N.D.
1903); Johnson v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 143 N.W. 959, 964 (S.D. 1913).
160.
E.g., Nelson v. N.J. Short Line R.R. Co., 67 A. 1032, 1032 (N.J. Ch. 1907);
Menge v. Morris & E. R.R. Co., 67 A. 1028, 1029 (N.J. Ch. 1907); Yoder v. Columbus
& S. Ohio Elec. Co., 316 N.E.2d 477, 479 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). Contra Zirkle v. City
of Kingston, 396 S.W.2d 356, 361–62 (Tenn. 1965); Tenn. Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Paint
Rock Flume & Transp. Co., 160 S.W. 522, 523–24 (Tenn. 1913).
161.
E.g., Menge, 67 A. at 1029.
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pipe lines but mistakenly laid the lines on a nearby strip on the same
parcel. 162 The court required the gas company to move its lines even
though the plaintiff suffered no injury and the public might suffer
substantial harm:
[T]he facts that the parcels of land used lie very near those
condemned, and that the use of them injures [the landowner] no more
than would the use of the lands actually condemned, do not change the
mandate that his property cannot be taken for public use except in the
manner provided by law.
....
It is insisted that the removal of the pipe lines will, for a time, take
from the public in various cities and towns the use of gas; that a
removal of the lines will be a great hardship upon the company and its
patrons, the public. But [the owner’s] right to the undisturbed use of
his property is as fixed and as sacred as are the rights of the public. 163

In other cases of precondemnation entry, courts that allow a trespass
action have required the removal of railroad tracks, 164 utility poles and
lines, 165 and other substantial improvements. 166 One court even upheld a
landowner’s right to remove earth that the city had placed on his land in
connection with a street widening though the removal caused the street and
the adjoining sidewalk to subside. 167

162.
Lovett v. W. Va. Cent. Gas Co., 65 S.E. 196, 197 (W. Va. 1909).
163.
Id. at 198, 200.
164.
E.g., Denver & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sch.-Dist. No. 22 in Arapahoe County, 23
P. 978, 980 (Colo. 1890); Adams, 10 So. at 472; Daniels v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co.,
35 Iowa 129, 136–37 (1872); Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Hoskins, 32 So. 150, 151 (Miss. 1902);
Menge, 67 A. at 1030; Griswold, 97 N.W. at 541; Lewis v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 58
N.W. 580, 584–85 (S.D. 1894); Dulin v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 80 S.E. 145, 145–46 (W.
Va. 1913). Contra Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Englehart, 77 N.W. 1092, 1093–94
(Neb. 1899); Hyde v. Minn., D. & P. Ry. Co., 123 N.W. 849, 852 (S.D. 1909).
165.
E.g., Broome v. N.Y. & N.J. Tel. Co., 7 A. 851, 852 (N.J. Ch. 1887); Callen
v. Columbus Edison Elec. Light Co., 64 N.E. 141, 145 (Ohio 1902).
166.
E.g., Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land & Water Co., 118 P. 769, 773 (Idaho
1911) (suspending company’s right to flood property owner’s land); Ladue Group, L.C.
v. Level 3 Commc’ns, L.L.C., 111 S.W.3d 492, 493–94 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (ordering
removal of underground conduit). Contra Werninger v. City of Huntington, 88 S.E.
655, 657 (W. Va. 1916) (focusing on property owner’s knowledge of entry and failure to
object).
167.
Mayo v. City of Springfield, 136 Mass. 10, 14–15 (1883).
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Courts grant these broad remedies for the same reason that they
allow a trespass action—to protect property rights from abuses of the
condemnation power. 168 Ejectment and injunctive relief are very effective
tools for accomplishing that goal. The prospect of those forms of relief
undoubtedly provides a powerful disincentive for precondemnation entries.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
To protect private property rights, to prevent abuses of the
condemnation power, and to preserve public support for the government
and for the legal system, a trespass action should always be available for
precondemnation entry, whether the condemnor is public or private and
whether it entered in good or bad faith. In many cases, an inverse
condemnation action will fully compensate the owner so that only nominal
damages are available in the trespass action. Though the damages may be
nominal, the underlying principles for allowing the action are not.
Immunizing condemnors from trespass liability is particularly harmful
because of the eminent domain context. The aftermath of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London 169 clearly
demonstrates the hostility that many Americans harbor toward
government takings. Since the Court’s holding in Kelo that a city could
condemn land for economic redevelopment, including by private entities,
forty-two states have enacted constitutional amendments or legislation to
provide greater protection for private property rights than the Supreme
168.
Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 248 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. Ct. App.
1952) (“[A] private corporation, invested by law with a portion of the sovereignty of
the state in its grant of the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is not
thereby clothed with an immunity not possessed by others who trespass upon the
property or rights of private citizens, and must answer for its trespasses in the same
manner as any other trespasser.”); Yoder v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 316 N.E.2d
477, 479 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (“Although plaintiff may have an action at law for
damages because of trespass, such a remedy is not an adequate remedy which would
preclude injunctive relief to prevent the taking of the property of plaintiff by defendant
for its use without first paying compensation to plaintiff. . . . To hold that the existence
of the remedy for damages for such unconstitutional appropriation precludes injunctive
relief renders nugatory the constitutional requirement that the compensation be first
made in money.”); Dulin v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 80 S.E. 145, 145 (W. Va. 1913)
(“[Denying ejectment] would be contrary to the landowner’s constitutional right. It
would be taking a man’s land, not only without his consent, but also without due
process; in fact, without any legal process whatever. Because a railroad company is
clothed with the right of eminent domain gives it no excuse to proceed arbitrarily to
take an owner’s land.”).
169.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

Burkhart 10.0

2008]

3/24/2008 4:48 PM

Takings and Trespass

377

Court found in the federal Constitution. 170
Precondemnation entry cases are even more troublesome than Kelo
because they involve a condemnor that failed to comply with the eminent
domain laws and violated one of the most important aspects of land
ownership, the right to exclude. In his seminal article on takings law,
Professor Frank Michelman vividly described the importance of this right:
Physical possession doubtless is the most cherished prerogative, and
the most dramatic index, of ownership of tangible things.
Sophisticated rationalizations and assurances of overall evenness
which may stand up as long as one’s possessions are unmolested may
wilt before the stark spectacle of an alien, uninvited presence in one’s
territory. The psychological shock, the emotional protest, the symbolic
threat to all property and security, may be expected to reach their
highest pitch when government is an unabashed invader. 171

When this right is wrongfully invaded, many owners will not believe
that they have been fully compensated by receiving just the value of the
land. They also want compensation for the wrong they have suffered. In
recognition of the sense of violation that a landowner can feel in this
situation, courts that allow a trespass action for a precondemnation entry
have often awarded damages for emotional distress.
The condemnor’s failure to comply with the eminent domain laws is
especially harmful to public support for the legal system because
landowners do not have a choice about whether to sell. The taking is a
forced sale and often involves property that is particularly meaningful to
the owner, such as a home or farm. Without prior condemnation
proceedings, the owner does not have an opportunity to challenge the
condemnor’s power to take the land before it enters and may not even
have notice that the taking will occur.
The injury is further compounded because the owner will have to
accept a price for the land that it normally views as being too low. Due to
the “endowment effect,” owners generally value their property at

170.
Id. at 488–90; see also National Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent
Domain, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/EMINDOMAIN.htm (last visited Mar.
14, 2008).
171.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1228 (1967)
(footnote omitted).
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significantly more than its economic value. 172 In one study, owners valued
their property at twice what buyers were willing to pay. 173 Therefore, even
when the condemnor pays the land’s fair market value after entering,
owners may feel that they have received less than the amount to which they
are entitled.
The proffered rationales for protecting condemnors from trespass
liability are unconvincing and do not outweigh these harmful effects. As
described above, some courts deny a trespass action on the basis that the
government has sovereign rights to land and, therefore, need not comply
with constitutional or other legal limits on the right to take it. 174 However,
a constitution is intended to protect the individual from the government.
Not even the sovereign immunity doctrine can shield the government from
claims grounded in the constitution. Moreover, the sovereignty rationale
does not explain why private condemnors are not liable for trespass.
Other courts reason that a condemnor that wrongfully enters
another’s land should not be included in the same category as other types
of trespassers for liability purposes. 175 These courts acknowledge that the
condemnor’s entry violated the law but hold that it should not be liable for
trespass because, unlike other trespassers, it can acquire title to the land in
subsequent condemnation proceedings. Based on this reasoning, a
shoplifter should be exempt from liability if it subsequently pays the store
for the stolen object.
By denying trespass liability, these courts create substantial incentives
for condemnors to ignore the eminent domain laws. By doing so,
condemnors can acquire possession of land more quickly and can defer
payment of compensation or even avoid it completely if the owner does not
bring an inverse condemnation action. The substantial number of cases
involving bad faith entries by condemnors demonstrates the power of these
incentives and strongly belies the presumption of good faith that some
courts cite as justification for denying a trespass action.

172.
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 13, 19 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
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Id. at 18–19. Contra Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness
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(2005).
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Absent sovereign immunity, trespass actions are available against
public and private entities with the power of eminent domain in every
situation except precondemnation entry. This exception is particularly
inappropriate because property takings, even those conducted according to
law, are extremely intrusive. When these takings are conducted in
violation of the law, the owner suffers more than just the loss of land. The
owner is also the victim of wrongful government-authorized conduct.
Unless the law provides recourse for this injury, it loses its legitimacy and
instead serves as a tool of the government against its citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
When a public or private entity with the power of eminent domain
enters land before acquiring title to it, courts vary tremendously on the
issue of trespass liability. The variations among the courts are attributable
to the different balances that they strike between two fundamental
principles of our legal system—government sovereignty over land and
protection of private property rights. At one end of the spectrum, some
courts hold that a trespass action is always available. 176 At the opposite
end, other courts hold that a trespass action is never available. 177 Courts in
the remaining jurisdictions have adopted a variety of intermediate rules
that permit a trespass action in some situations but not in others. 178
A court’s decision on this issue has tremendous practical importance.
When a trespass action is available, a landowner has a far broader range of
available remedies than it does in an inverse condemnation action. For
example, the owner may be able to recover consequential and punitive
damages, as well as ejectment and injunctive relief. Additionally, in the
subsequent condemnation proceedings, a court that allows a trespass action
will value the property as of the date of the proceedings, rather than the
date of the wrongful entry, and it may award the landowner the land’s
rental value for the period between those dates. Finally, in some states, the
statute of limitations for trespass is longer than for inverse condemnation,
and the right to a jury trial may exist for one action but not for the other.
As important as the trespass action may be to the injured landowner,
it is at least as valuable to the community as a whole. The action’s
availability establishes that every person, including the government, acts
wrongfully by trespassing on another’s land. To excuse government and
176.
177.
178.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C–E.
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private condemnors from this liability puts them above the law and
decreases public support for the government and for the legal system.
Therefore, a condemnor that takes another’s land before condemning it
should always be liable for trespass, as well as for inverse condemnation.

